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Abstract: This article notes the judgment in Sophocleous v Secretary of State for the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in which the High Court dealt with the law 
applicable to civil claims arising out of alleged acts of torture committed by British 
military and security services in the colony of Cyprus in the 1950s. The judgment is 
important because it sheds light on some underexplored corners of choice of law (law 
governing the external aspects of vicarious liability and of accessory liability in tort) and 
reaches the conclusion, which runs against the grain of other recent judgments given 
in civil claims brought against the Crown for the external exercise of governmental 
authority, that English law governs. 
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Many civil claims have recently been brought against different government 
departments, officials and agents for torts allegedly committed by British military and 
security services in the course of overseas counterterrorism, military and 
peacekeeping operations. The vast majority of these claims concern operations in 
Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan and the assistance that British security services have 
provided to their United States counterparts in the context of the ‘war on terror’. There 
is one set of claims, however, which does not concern these relatively recent external 
projections of British sovereign power. In January 2018, Mr Justice Kerr handed down 
a judgment in Sophocleous v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office,1 which dealt with the choice-of-law aspects of civil claims brought by 34 Greek 
Cypriots for wrongs allegedly committed by British soldiers and the British and colonial 
governments during the suppression of the Cypriot independence movement in the 
mid to late 1950s. 
The judgment deals with the law applicable to the issues of limitation and basis 
of liability in claims founded on 1) vicarious liability, 2) accessory liability in tort and 3) 
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the negligence of the defendants, the successors to the Secretaries of State for the 
Colonial Office and the War Office. The defendants conceded that the claims were 
justiciable, so the Crown act of State doctrine was not examined. The choice-of-law 
issues raised by the first two kinds of claim have received little attention in the past, 
both in case law and academic literature. With respect to all three kinds of claim, the 
court applied a flexible exception to the relevant choice-of-law rule and decided that 
English law governed. This outcome is somewhat surprising because it runs against 
the grain of other recent judgments given in civil claims against the Crown, where the 
issue of attribution of conduct of British soldiers was routinely subject to the rules of 
public international law and the issues of limitation and basis of liability were routinely 
said to be governed by the foreign law of the place of the tort. Sophocleous is of 
importance for shedding light on some underexplored corners of choice of law and for 
prompting us to question the routine application of the rules of public international law 
and of the foreign law of the place of the tort in other recent judgments given in civil 
claims against the Crown. 
 
II. A GHOST FROM THE PAST: THE FACTS AND LEGAL ISSUES 
 
Sophocleous is not the first conflict of laws case concerned with the external exercise 
of governmental authority in Cyprus. In A-G v Nissan,2 the English courts dealt with a 
claim for trespass to chattels said to have been committed by British soldiers in this 
country in the early 1960s. The cause of action in this case arose after Cyprus had 
obtained independence and British soldiers were present and operating in this country 
initially at the invitation of the government of Cyprus and later as part of a United 
Nations (UN) peacekeeping force. Sophocleous, in contrast, dealt with the period 
before independence. Here, some soldiers in the British Army and British police 
officers and agents seconded to the then Colonial Administration of Cyprus were 
accused of having tortured 34 Greek Cypriots in the following gruesome ways: 
assaults, shooting in the ear, striking with rifles, tying the hands between the 
legs impairing breathing, wrapping a blanket round the head, whipping with an 
iron edged whip tearing the skin from the back, rubbing salt into wounds, 
punching and kicking, placing a tin bucket on the head and striking the bucket 
with a hammer, deprivation of water, forcing a person to swallow salt, shining 
bright light into the eyes, sleep deprivation, placing blocks of ice on the body, 
subjection to electric shocks, threats of death including placing one claimant in 
a coffin, simulated executions including simulation of hanging by putting the 
head through a noose, rape of one claimant, a young female student and a 
virgin at the time, tightening with screws an ‘iron wreath’ placed around the head 
causing discharge of blood from the ears and eye sockets, simulation of 
drowning, a threat to cut off a person's penis and testicles, being left naked in a 
small dark space alone for days, stubbing out cigarettes on the exposed rectum, 
slamming the head into a wall and being made to stand for long periods in a 
stress position.3 
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None of these facts have been proved by the claimants, but were assumed for the 
purpose of dealing with the choice-of-law aspects of the case. 
Since the alleged acts of torture fall outside the temporal scope of the Human 
Rights Act 1998, claims against the Crown could only be brought under private law. 
More specifically, three kinds of claim were advanced: 1) on the basis of the 
defendants’ vicarious liability for the torts of battery and assault committed by primary 
tortfeasors; 2) for the defendants’ involvement in the commission of these batteries 
and assaults by the colonial government, and 3) for the negligence of the defendants 
by allowing these batteries and assaults to take place or failing to prevent them. Since 
the alleged acts of torture were committed in Cyprus, the choice-of-law problem arose 
with respect to each category of claim. 
Not only do these acts fall outside the temporal scope of the human rights 
legislation but also outside the temporal scope of the Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 (1995 Act)4 and outside both the temporal scope 
and subject-matter scope of the Rome II Regulation.5 For the purpose of applying the 
common law choice-of-law rules for torts, the court had to decide first where in 
substance the causes of action arose.6 If in substance the causes of action arose in 
England, English law would apply.7 If in substance the causes of action arose in 
Cyprus, the applicable law would fall to be determined under the double actionability 
rule.8 According to this rule, an act done in a foreign country can be sued for as a tort 
in England only if it would have been a tort if it had been done in England and also if it 
is actionable according to the law of the foreign country where it was done. There is, 
however, a flexible exception which allows the court to depart from either limb of the 
double actionability rule in favour of the sole application of English law9 or the sole 
application of the law of the place of the tort.10 
Although the question where in substance the causes of action arose was asked 
for the purpose of applying the common law choice-of-law rules for torts, now 
applicable only in cases falling outside the temporal scope of the 1995 Act and the 
Rome II Regulation and to defamation claims,11 the discussion of this issue in 
Sophocleous is of wider importance. This is because the courts ask the same question 
to decide whether a claim falls within the jurisdictional gateway for torts in Civil 
Procedure Rules Practice Direction 6B by reason of damage which has been or will be 
sustained resulting from an act committed, or likely to be committed, within the 
jurisdiction12 and to apply the rule that the place where in substance a tort arises is a 
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weighty factor pointing to that jurisdiction being the appropriate one.13 The common 
law authorities are admittedly of very limited use for identifying, for the purpose of the 
1995 Act, where the most significant element or elements of the events constituting 
the tort in question occurred.14 Nevertheless, Sophocleous is of some relevance in this 
context because it addresses the nature of vicarious liability and accessory liability in 
tort and can thus facilitate the location of the elements of the cause of action in a claim 
based on vicarious liability or accessory liability. This aspect of Sophocleous is also of 
some relevance in the context of the Rome II Regulation. Additionally, the value of 
Sophocleous lies in the fact that it provides a useful contrast to other recent judgments 
given in civil claims against the Crown which dealt with choice of law. 
 
III. VICARIOUS LIABILITY IN CHOICE OF LAW 
 
The claimants’ first claim was that the defendants were vicariously liable for the torts 
committed by British soldiers, the torts committed by British police officers and agents 
seconded to the Colonial Administration of Cyprus and the torts of the colonial 
government itself.15 
The argument that the Crown is vicariously liable for the torts committed by the 
British soldiers in question seems strong. According to the assumed facts, the soldiers 
were deployed by the British government from the United Kingdom.16 They answered 
to their military commander in the British Army.17 The British Army had the power to 
discipline and dismiss the soldiers through the court-martial system.18 
The vicarious liability of the Crown for the torts committed by British police 
officers and agents seconded to the Colonial Administration and the torts committed 
by the Colonial Administration itself raises more complicated issues. Since the police 
officers and agents in question were seconded to the colonial government, a 
sufficiently close connection between the Crown and the police officers and agents and 
their acts has to be established. Similarly, the Crown can be vicariously liable for the 
torts of the Colonial Administration only if there is a sufficiently close connection 
between the Crown and the colonial government and its acts. In order to establish the 
existence of a sufficiently close connection, some legal tests will have to be applied 
and these tests are to be found in the system of law which governs the issue of 
vicarious liability. The claimants’ argument was that this issue was governed by English 
law and that vicarious liability should be imposed on the Crown because the British 
government ‘exercised de iure and/or de facto control over the Security Forces 
operating in Cyprus’.19 
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Two points emerge from the court’s discussion. One concerns the nature of 
vicarious liability and the relevance thereof for deciding where in substance the causes 
of action arose. It should be mentioned in this respect that vicarious liability involves at 
least three parties and three kinds of relationship. The three parties are the primary 
tortfeasor, the vicariously liable person and the victim. The three kinds of relationship 
are the internal relationship between the primary tortfeasor and the vicariously liable 
person and the external relationships between the victim and the primary tortfeasor 
and the victim and the vicariously liable person. The court in Sophocleous was only 
concerned with the external relationship between the victim and the vicariously liable 
person. Is vicarious liability a tort in its own right or, as the defendants argued, a 
mechanism for the attribution of liability to a person for a tort committed by someone 
else? The liability of the vicariously liable person is derivative in the sense that there 
can be no liability before the primary tortfeasor has committed a tort. But is the liability 
of the vicariously liable person also autonomous in the sense that this person is not 
held liable for the tort of the primary tortfeasor but for his or her own fault which consists 
in somehow enabling or facilitating the primary tort? If the liability of the vicariously 
liable person is autonomous, then it could be argued that the crucial factor for locating 
the causes of action is the exercise of control by the Crown over the operations in 
Cyprus and the making of policy decisions, which occurred in England.20 If the 
vicarious liability of the Crown is considered to be dependent on the primary torts, then 
the crucial factor for locating the causes of action is the place where these torts were 
committed.21 
The court dealt briefly with this point. It accepted that in English law22 vicarious 
liability is not, conceptually, a tort. ‘It is the description of a legal rule which imposes 
liability for someone else’s tort.’23 This is clearly correct.24 Vicarious liability is based 
on the relationship between the primary tortfeasor and the vicariously liable person and 
on the fact that the primary tort occurred in the course of a specific task or in the course 
of employment. It is not based on the fact that the vicariously liable person somehow 
enabled, facilitated or participated in the primary tort. Vicarious liability is not personal. 
It is imposed despite the (usual) innocence of the vicariously liable person. The 
vicariously liable person can therefore be said to incur liability in the place where the 
primary tort is committed. In the present case, the causes of action based on vicarious 
liability arose in Cyprus, which meant that the double actionability rule applied. 
This insight concerning the nature of vicarious liability is of some relevance for 
claims to which the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 and 
the Rome II Regulation apply. Under the 1995 Act, the applicable law is, subject to the 
operation of a displacement rule, the law of the country in which the events constituting 
the tort in question occur.25 In its 1990 report preceding the adoption of the 1995 Act,26 
the Law Commission wrote that there was little support among consultants for the 
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proposition that the law applicable in an action by the claimant against a vicariously 
liable defendant should always be the same as that which would have applied in an 
action by the claimant against the actual wrongdoer on the ground that an action 
against the wrongdoer is a logically separate issue from that against a potentially 
vicariously liable defendant.27 The recommendation was that no mention be made of 
this in implementing legislation.28 It can be said, following the reasoning in 
Sophocleous, that, in a case of vicarious liability, the events constituting the tort in 
question occur in the place where the primary tort is committed.29 This conclusion is 
supported by the wording of the 1995 Act. The general choice-of-law rule of the Act 
speaks of the events constituting ‘the tort in question’. Sophocleous confirms that, in a 
case of vicarious liability, there is only one tort, namely that committed by the primary 
tortfeasor, which therefore has to be ‘the tort in question’ for the purposes of the 
general rule. Under Rome II, the general choice-of-law rule for torts is that the law 
applicable to a tort, subject to the common habitual residence rule and the operation 
of an escape clause, is the law of the country in which the damage occurs irrespective 
of the country in which the event giving rise to the damage occurred and irrespective 
of the country or countries in which the indirect consequences of that event occur.30 
The reasoning in Sophocleous suggests that, in a case of vicarious liability,31 the focus 
should be on the primary tort when determining the applicable law under the general 
rule. The law of the country to which the general rules of the 1995 Act and Rome II 
point can, however, be displaced by the operation of the displacement rule in section 
12 of the 1995 Act and the exceptions in Article 4(2) and (3) of Rome II. 
The second point that emerges from the court’s discussion of vicarious liability 
and choice of law in Sophocleous is that the doctrine of vicarious liability, as developed 
in English law, is perfectly capable of dealing with the question whether the Crown 
should be liable for the acts and omissions of British military and security services 
placed at the disposal of another body, in this case the Colonial Administration in 
Cyprus. This insight is important because it allows us to question some of the other 
recent judgments given in civil claims against the Crown. In R (Al-Jedda) v Secretary 
of State for Defence,32 Mohammed v Ministry of Defence33 and Kontić v Ministry of 
Defence,34 the English courts were faced with the question whether the acts and 
omissions of British soldiers present and operating in, respectively, Iraq, Afghanistan 
and Kosovo should be attributed to the Crown, the UN, International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF), Kosovo Force (KFOR) or the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO). In these three cases, the English courts applied directly the rules 
of public international law on attribution of conduct, now contained primarily in the 
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts35 and Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
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Organizations36 and in the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in 
Behrami v France37 and Al-Jedda v United Kingdom.38 In none of these three cases 
did the English courts explain why, and on what basis, the rules of public international 
law were being directly applied and municipal laws were being disregarded. 
Sophocleous, as a case that concerned the relationship between the Crown and 
the then Colonial Administration of Cyprus, is outside the purview of public international 
law.39 But the way in which the case was argued and approached by the court shows 
that the English law of vicarious liability is capable of taking into account the nature 
and extent of authority and control exercised by the Crown over its soldiers, officers 
and agents present and operating abroad and placed at the disposal of another body, 
and of deriving from this the relevant legal consequences. The facts that were 
advanced by the claimants in Sophocleous40 are of the same kind as the facts that the 
courts considered in Al-Jedda, Mohammed and Kontić to determine the nature and 
extent of authority and control exercised by the Crown over its soldiers, officers and 
agents present and operating in Iraq, Afghanistan and Kosovo for the purpose of 
applying the rules of public international law. Sophocleous thus indicates that the 
reasoning in Al-Jedda, Mohammed and Kontić was far from satisfactory. Faced with a 
situation where the issue of attribution of conduct could have been resolved by either 
the application of the rules of public international law on attribution or the rules of 
municipal law on vicarious liability and agency, the English courts should have offered 
some explanation for their decisions directly to apply the rules of public international 
law and disregard municipal laws. This leaves the impression that the choice of law in 
this area is being developed in a haphazard and unprincipled way. 
 
IV. ACCESSORY LIABILITY IN TORT IN CHOICE OF LAW 
 
Vicarious liability gives rise to joint liability on the part of the primary tortfeasor and his 
or her employer or principal. Joint liability in tort may arise in a number of other ways. 
In Sophocleous, the liability of the Crown was alleged to have arisen out of a common 
design between the British government and the Colonial Administration to restore law 
and order in Cyprus and to obtain intelligence, using torture if necessary, and out of 
the assistance, encouragement and advice that the British government provided to the 
colonial government in furtherance of the common design.41 In the English law of torts, 
liability for participation in a common design is a species of what is known as accessory 
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or accessorial liability.42 Accessory liability also exists where a party authorizes or 
induces another to commit a tort.43 
Issues raised by accessory liability in tort, as well as by joint liability more 
generally, may be divided into two categories.44 One set of issues, which includes the 
existence and division of liability among tortfeasors, concerns the external relationship 
of a group of tortfeasors in relation to their victim(s). The other set of issues, which 
includes subrogation, contribution and indemnification,45 concerns the internal 
relationship among tortfeasors. Different laws have different rules on issues 
concerning both kinds of relationship in accessory liability cases. In the English law of 
torts, for example, accessory liability has been recently addressed in a high-profile 
judgment of the Supreme Court in Fish & Fish Ltd v Sea Shepherd UK.46 The judgment 
confirms that accessory liability will come about if the claimant proves two elements: 
‘D [the defendant] must have acted in a way which furthered the commission of the tort 
by P [the primary tortfeasor]; and D must have done so in pursuance of a common 
design to do or secure the doing of the acts which constituted the tort.’47 Other laws 
may require proof of different elements. The requirement of common design in the 
English law of torts is relatively strict. In some other laws knowing assistance may be 
sufficient in and of itself to give rise to joint liability on the part of the accessory.48 That 
is one of the reasons why choice of law is of considerable importance for claims based 
on accessory liability in tort.49 
Locating a cause of action based on accessory liability in tort is not a mean feat. 
There may be a number of alleged tortfeasors and victims who may be located in a 
number of countries. The formation of a common design and acts done in furtherance 
of it, as well as any acts of inducement and assistance, may occur in different places. 
As may acts which constitute the primary tort. A claim for accessory liability may give 
rise to a number of issues, which may be connected to different countries in different 
ways. It is beyond the scope of this paper to deal with all the possible scenarios. Suffice 
it to note for the present purpose that the claims in Sophocleous were relatively 
straightforward. Here, the Crown, located in England, was said to have combined with 
the Colonial Administration in Cyprus to do or secure the doing of torts in Cyprus 
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against Cypriot residents. The issues raised by the claims were limitation and the 
existence of accessory liability. 
To answer the question where in substance the causes of action arose, the 
court had to address the nature of accessory liability in tort. Is it similar to vicarious 
liability in the sense of being derivative and dependant, which would undoubtedly point 
to the (law of the) place of the primary tort? In Fish & Fish, Lord Sumption said the 
following about the nature of accessory liability in the English law of torts: ‘the 
accessory’s liability is not for the assistance. He is liable for the tortious act of the 
primary actor, because by reason of the assistance the law treats him as a party to 
it.’50 This led the judge in Sophocleous to conclude that accessory liability was different 
from vicarious liability and that no analogy was possible. In a vicarious liability case, 
the person vicariously liable is usually not personally a wrongdoer51 and liability is 
based on the relationship between the person vicariously liable and the individual 
perpetrator of the tort.52 In an accessory liability case, in contrast, the accessory and 
the primary tortfeasor are both wrongdoers and liability is not derived from the 
relationship between the accessory and the primary tortfeasor, but from the 
accessory’s participation in the primary tort.53 That much is uncontroversial.54 
The judge also made some further comments about the nature of accessory 
liability in tort. The judge said that: 
the accessory and the principal are joint tortfeasors and no less so than in a 
case of direct joint participation in the tort. 
This is because, as Lord Sumption explained, the law treats the accessory as a 
party to the primary tortfeasor's act. The accessory is liable not for the 
assistance given but as a party to the primary tortious act. That is as much the 
case in an accessory liability case … as where an assault is committed by two 
persons each wielding a hammer and attacking the victim together.55 
According to the judge, in a claim based on accessory liability ‘the allegation is one of 
joint liability for the same tort’,56 where ‘the essence of the tort is the common design 
or combination, such that the law makes the accessory a party to the primary tortious 
act’.57 Elsewhere, the judge described the liability of the accessory as ‘secondary’.58 
These comments disclose a degree of confusion about the nature of accessory 
liability in tort. On one hand, the judge considered that the accessory and the primary 
tortfeasor commit only one tort either because they are joint principals or because 
accessory liability is a doctrine which attributes the liability of the primary tortfeasor to 
the accessory. On the other hand, describing the liability of the accessory as 
‘secondary’ could be read as implying that accessory liability is a doctrine which makes 
the accessory liable for an independent wrong which is parasitic upon the primary tort. 
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In other words, if P commits a tort against V with A’s assistance, the judge’s comments 
seem to support two different ways of conceptualising A’s wrong. One way (alternative 
(1)) is to say that P and A have committed one tort59 for which they are both jointly 
liable. Another way (alternative (2)) is to say that P committed the primary tort and that 
A committed an independent wrong, which is parasitic upon the primary tort. 
This part of the judgment can be criticised on the basis that a clear determination 
of the nature of accessory liability in tort is crucial for the purpose of choice of law for 
at least two reasons. Firstly, the location of a cause of action based on accessory 
liability may depend on this. If the accessory and the primary tortfeasor are treated as 
having committed only one tort (alternative (1)), then a cause of action based on 
accessory liability can only arise where that tort took place. If accessory liability is 
regarded as a doctrine which makes the accessory liable for an independent wrong, 
which is parasitic upon the primary tort (alternative (2)), it becomes possible for a cause 
of action based on accessory liability to arise outside the place of the primary tort. 
Secondly, the outcome of the choice-of-law process may depend on the view taken 
with respect to the nature of accessory liability. Under alternative (1), one law inevitably 
governs the liability of the accessory and the primary tortfeasor. But under alternative 
(2), the liability of the accessory and that of the primary tortfeasor may be subject to 
separate laws because their liabilities arise out of separate wrongs. 
Having commented on the nature of accessory liability in tort, the judge in 
Sophocleous proceeded with the location of the causes of action in question. This was 
a difficult task. The decision of the court seems to have been based on the view that 
the accessory and the primary tortfeasor commit only one tort (alternative (1) above),60 
with the consequence that ‘the substance of the joint tort must be committed in one 
country, not two or more’.61 On one hand, it could be said that ‘the “engine” of the 
wrong was in England; that the formation of the common design proceeded from 
there’.62 On the other hand, the entire purpose of the alleged common design was to 
do or secure the doing of torts in Cyprus. On balance, the judge concluded that in 
substance the causes of action arose in Cyprus: 
the location of the common design liability should be the same as the location 
of the ultimate individual perpetrator's liability, which is also that of the other 
partner in the common design. I think it is artificial to treat the common design 
liability of the defendants, jointly with the then Colonial Administration, as 
located in a different country from that in which the ultimate perpetrators of the 
assaults, who executed the design, are located.63 
As a result, the double actionability rule applied. 
It is well documented how the use of the concept of ‘joint tortfeasance’ has 
obscured the nature and elements of accessory liability in the substantive law of torts.64 
Sophocleous is an example of this phenomenon in the area of choice of law. The 
judge’s discussion of the location of the causes of action based on accessory liability 
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in tort was founded on the following assumption: ‘I do not think that [the application of 
different laws] is likely or even possible where the allegation is one of joint liability for 
the same tort’.65 But while it may be true that it is unlikely for a cause of action based 
on accessory liability to arise outside the place of the primary tort, it is not impossible 
that this may occur and that the liability of the accessory may be governed by a law 
different from that governing the liability of the primary tortfeasor. Indeed, Sophocleous 
itself is an example of this. Here, the court eventually applied the flexible exception to 
the double actionability rule and held English law to be applicable to the alleged 
accessory liability of the defendant, although the primary torts remained subject to 
Cypriot law. The wrong of the accessory is therefore best regarded as independent 
from, although deriving from and parasitic upon, the primary tort (alternative (2) above). 
The insights concerning the nature of accessory liability in tort are of some 
relevance for determining the law governing the external relationship in accessory 
liability cases to which the Private International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 
1995 and the Rome II Regulation apply. While Rome II expressly deals with 
subrogation66 and contribution and indemnification among several debtors who are 
liable for the same claim,67 there are no express provisions or any case law dealing 
with the external relationship in accessory liability cases under either the 1995 Act or 
Rome II.68 The reports and memoranda preceding the adoption of the 1995 Act and 
Rome II are silent on this issue, as are case law and academic commentaries. If 
accessory liability is understood as independent, but derivative from and parasitic to, 
the primary tort, it follows that, in a claim based on accessory liability, the country in 
which the events constituting the tort or delict in question occur (for the purpose of the 
general choice-of-law rule in section 11 of the 1995 Act) and the country in which the 
damage occurs (for the purpose of the general choice of law rule in Article 4(1) of Rome 
II) will usually be the country of the primary tort. The law of this country can, however, 
be displaced by the operation of the displacement rule in section 12 of the 1995 Act 
and the exceptions in Article 4(2) and (3) of Rome II. Another consequence of this 
understanding of the nature of accessory liability in tort is that this kind of liability is 
better analysed by comparing and contrasting it with the instances of accessory liability 
in other areas of the conflict of laws69 than by using the concept of joint tortfeasance. 
 
V. FLEXIBLE EXCEPTIONS AND POLITICAL AND MILITARY CONTEXTS 
 
Having decided that in substance all the causes of action arose in Cyprus,70 the court 
turned to the question whether to assess the actionability of the Crown’s acts under 
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both English and Cypriot laws or to apply the flexible exception to the double 
actionability rule. 
The court found itself in uncharted territory here. Notwithstanding the existence 
of cases applying the flexible exception to the double actionability rule,71 the court 
thought that it was faced with a novel situation. Sophocleous was said to be a case 
‘like no other in the lexicon of reported cases’.72 This is because it concerned ‘the 
political element …, namely the deliberate use of force as an instrument of government 
policy in the exercise of state power’.73 The factors that the court took into account in 
order to decide whether to apply the flexible exception were inevitably shaped by this 
‘political and military context’.74 
One factor was the colonial background of the case, in particular the fact that 
the law of the colony of Cyprus before independence was made by the United 
Kingdom. In other words, the defendants represented the State that had made the very 
law under which it might have immunized or protected itself against suit.75 Another 
factor was the strength of the connection with the United Kingdom: ‘it was [the Crown] 
which bore responsibility for justice in Cyprus; and many of the key decisions and 
instructions emanated from London’.76 A third factor was the constitutional context of 
the case: ‘all three pleaded torts engage the special responsibility of the State where 
violence is deliberately inflicted on its citizens. In … the vicarious liability and joint 
liability claims, the claimants seek to hold the defendants directly responsible for the 
injuries.’77 This factor was held to be particularly relevant in light of the seriousness of 
the alleged acts of violence in Cyprus.78 A fourth factor was said to be the 
disinterestedness of the independent State of Cyprus in the application of its law, which 
meant that there was no reason of comity to apply the contemporary Cypriot law of 
torts.79 Finally, a relevant factor was also the fact that the English law of torts is well-
equipped to deal with claims advanced against the Crown.80 The outcome was that the 
flexible exception to the double actionability rule was applied and English law was held 
to be solely applicable. Consequently, the issues of limitation and basis of liability were 
subject to English law. 
It is striking that the judgment in Sophocleous does not mention any of the many 
recent judgments handed down in civil claims against the Crown which concerned the 
external projection of British sovereign power in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan and in 
the course of rendering assistance to the American security services in the context of 
the ‘war on terror’. These claims fell within the temporal scope of the Private 
International Law (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995, but outside the temporal and 
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subject-matter scope of the Rome II Regulation.81 The courts hearing these claims 
were therefore confronted with the question whether English law should be applied on 
the basis that its application was ‘substantially more appropriate’ than the application 
of the foreign law of the place of the tort.82 The courts in all of these cases were 
unanimous that, despite their political and military context, it was the law of the foreign 
place of the tort that applied.83 Admittedly, the flexible exception to the double 
actionability rule and the displacement rule in section 12 of the 1995 Act are not the 
same. Nevertheless, if some of the factors taken into account in Sophocleous are also 
relevant for cases falling within the scope of the 1995 Act, that would provide the basis 
for questioning either the outcome of Sophocleous or the choice-of-law decisions in 
the other recent judgments handed down in civil claims against the Crown. 
Sophocleous arose out of a colonial context. The other recent judgments given 
in civil claims against the Crown dealt with the presence and operations of British 
military and security services in independent States. This appears to be a crucial 
distinction, but only at first sight. Cases like Al-Jedda,84 Rahmatullah, Mohammed85 
and Kontić86 demonstrate that the presence and operations of British forces overseas 
may be a consequence of a military intervention, such as an invasion and subsequent 
occupation, to which the country in which the intervention has taken place has not 
consented and whose legality under public international law may be controversial. The 
presence and operations of British forces overseas may be based on treaties and 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions which are adopted post hoc and 
reflect the facts on the ground and give extensive privileges and immunities to British 
troops. Such treaties and UNSC resolutions create regimes which are not dissimilar to 
those created by capitulations through which Western powers were granted the 
privilege of extraterritoriality in oriental countries, dubbed ‘colonialism without 
colonies’.87 
In any event, it was not the fact that Cyprus was a British colony that in and of 
itself justified the application of English law in Sophocleous. It was rather the fact that 
the law of the colony of Cyprus was made by the United Kingdom under which it might 
have immunized or protected itself against suit. But this is similar to what happened in 
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the Kontić case.88 This case concerned the presence and operations of British forces 
in Kosovo in 1999. An issue raised by this case was whether the immunity granted to 
KFOR barred the commencement of proceedings in the English courts for the alleged 
wrongful acts and omissions of British soldiers in Kosovo forming part of KFOR. The 
immunity of KFOR was based on two legal instruments: the Joint Declaration of the 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General and the Commander of KFOR 
adopted on 17 August 2000 and Regulation 2000/47 on the status, privileges and 
immunities of KFOR and UNMIK (the UN Mission in Kosovo) and their personnel in 
Kosovo adopted on 18 August 2000 by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General to implement the Joint Declaration. The Joint Declaration provided that 
‘UNMIK and KFOR … are immune from any form of legal process’.89 The court held 
that, pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1244, UNMIK, through the Special Representative, 
was empowered to change, repeal or suspend existing laws in Kosovo to the extent 
necessary for the carrying out of his functions, or where existing laws were 
incompatible with the mandate, aims and purposes of the interim civil administration.90 
The court then stated obiter that, ‘It follows that the immunity conferred under UNMIK 
Regulation 2000/47 became part of the substantive law of Kosovo.’91 The 
consequence of this non sequitur was that the immunity of KFOR in Kosovo had the 
effect of barring any civil claim brought against the defendant in both Kosovo and the 
UK.92 If the fact that the foreign law of the place of the tort should not be applied to 
determine the lability of the Crown because the United Kingdom made that law and 
could have immunized or protected itself against suit is a factor that points away from 
the application of that law, then the fact that the commanders of a military force of 
which British troops formed part could participate in the making of, or even 
independently make,93 laws which grant extensive privileges and immunities to British 
forces ought similarly to point away from the application of the foreign place of the tort. 
Another important factor in Sophocleous was its constitutional context. Similarly, 
all the other recent judgments handed down in civil claims against the Crown involved 
the responsibility and accountability of the Crown and the rule of law, which are matters 
of great constitutional concern. It is true that the court in Sophocleous attached 
particular weight to the fact that this case concerned the special responsibility of the 
State where violence was deliberately inflicted on its own citizens. But the Al-Jedda 
case also concerned a claim brought by a British citizen against the Crown. One could 
point out that in Al-Jedda the claimant also held the nationality of Iraq, the country in 
which the alleged torts were committed. But in Sophocleous all the claimants were 
resident in Cyprus, and presumably held Cypriot citizenships, at the moment of 
commencement of proceedings. 
This brings us to the stated disinterestedness of the independent State of 
Cyprus in the application of its law in Sophocleous. The court held94 that the Republic 
of Cyprus had no more interest in the application of its law than Malta did in Boys v 
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Chaplin95 or West Germany did in Johnson v Churchill Coventry International Ltd.96 
But these two cases are of a very different kind. Boys v Chaplin concerned a tort arising 
out of a traffic accident between two British military personnel temporarily stationed in 
Malta. Malta was held not to have any interest in the method for determining recovery 
of damages in the situation where the majority of the harm, and in particular the 
problematic loss of amenities and future financial losses, were to be suffered in Britain. 
Johnson v Churchill Coventry International Ltd concerned a tort arising out of an 
employment contract governed by English law between an English employee posted 
to Germany by his English employer. Germany was held not to have any interest in the 
application of its rule which was shaped by the German social security system of which 
the claimant was not a beneficiary and to which the claimant had not contributed. In 
contrast, all the claimants in Sophocleous were Cypriot residents and presumably 
Cypriot citizens at the moment of commencement of proceedings. The argument that 
the Republic of Cyprus had no interest in applying its law to a case that concerned the 
alleged acts of torture committed during the suppression of the Cypriot independence 
movement against persons who are now its residents and citizens and former 
independence fighters is not persuasive. 
The remaining two factors, namely the strength of the connection with the 
United Kingdom and the fact that the English law of torts is well-equipped to deal with 
claims advanced against the Crown, apply with equal force in both Sophocleus and 
the other recent civil claims brought against the Crown. Even if British soldiers are 
present and operate abroad as part of a multinational force (e.g. UN, ISAF, KFOR, 
NATO), the British Army retains a substantial amount of control over its troops and 
many of the key decisions and instructions will emanate from the United Kingdom. The 
English law of torts as it applies to claims against British military and security services 
is the same regardless of whether the torts are allegedly committed in a former colony 
or a foreign independent country. 
In conclusion, the judgment in Sophocleus can be criticized for not taking into 
account the other recent judgments handed down in civil claims against the Crown. 
But Sophocleus should be used as an opportunity to reflect on the choice-of-law 
aspects of other recent civil claims brought against the Crown for the external exercise 
of sovereign power. The choice-of-law issues in these civil claims were resolved 
following the strict interpretation of section 12 of the Private International Law 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1995 adopted in preceding cases,97 which almost 
exclusively concerned traffic accidents, accidents suffered in the course of 
employment and torts arising out of commercial dealings. But Sophocleus 
demonstrates that civil claims brought against the Crown in the aftermath of overseas 
counterterrorism, military and peacekeeping operations are ‘like no other in the lexicon 
of reported cases’98 and that the political, military and constitutional context of these 
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claims must seriously be taken into account. If this is done, there are good arguments 





Sophocleous is a rich case that deals with the law applicable to vicarious liability and 
accessory liability in tort. The choice-of-law issues raised by claims based on these 
kinds of liability have received little attention in the past. Sophocleous fills this gap by 
dealing with the nature of these kinds of liability and the relevance thereof for the 
location of the elements of the cause of action in a claim based on vicarious liability or 
accessory liability in tort. The insights that it offers are relevant not only for the purpose 
of the common law choice-of-law rules which the court was applying in Sophocleous, 
but also for the interpretation and application of the general choice-of-law rules for torts 
of the Private International Law (Miscellaneous) Provisions Act 1995 and the Rome II 
Regulation. Sophocleous is also important because it demonstrates that civil claims 
brought against the Crown in the aftermath of overseas counterterrorism, military and 
peacekeeping operations are ‘like no other in the lexicon of reported cases’ and that 
the political, military and constitutional context of these claims must seriously be taken 
into account. 
Sophocleous also allows us to reflect on and question the choice-of-law 
decisions made in other recent judgments handed down in civil claims against the 
Crown which concerned the external exercise of governmental authority. In these 
judgments, the issue of attribution of conduct of British soldiers was routinely subject 
to the rules of public international law and the issues of limitation and basis of liability 
were routinely said to be governed by the foreign law of the place of the tort. 
Sophocleous shows that the English law of vicarious liability is capable of taking into 
account the nature and extent of authority and control exercised by the Crown over its 
soldiers, officers and agents present and operating abroad and placed at the disposal 
of another body, and of deriving from this the relevant legal consequences. This, in 
turn, demonstrates that the reasoning in other recent judgments handed down in civil 
claims against the Crown which dealt with the issue of attribution is unsatisfactory and 
that the courts giving these judgments should have explained why, and on what basis, 
the rules of public international law were being directly applied and municipal laws were 
being disregarded. The factors that persuaded the court in Sophocleous to apply 
English law are also relevant for other civil claims brought against the Crown which 
concern the external exercise of sovereign authority, which indicates that it might be 
‘substantially more appropriate’ to also subject these claims to English law. It is to be 
hoped that the next time the English courts have the opportunity to deal with choice-
of-law issues raised by civil claims brought against the Crown in the aftermath of 
overseas counterterrorism, military and peacekeeping operations, they will seriously 
take into account the political, military and constitutional context of these claims and 
engage more meaningfully with the determination of the law governing the issues of 
attribution of conduct, limitation and basis of liability. 
